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I. Introduction 
The operations of the Bretton Woods Twins – the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank – have come under increasing public scrutiny in recent years.  Indeed, criticisms 
from the far left and the far right have become so vehement that in 1999, the U.S. Congress 
almost failed to pass legislation to provide the U.S. share of an internationally agreed increase 
in IMF funding.  In the spring of 2000, organizations that had protested against the World 
Trade Organization in Seattle turned their attention to Washington D.C. and attempted to shut 
down the high level meetings of the IMF’s and World Bank’s international oversight 
committees. 
 One common feature of most of the harshest critics from both the left and the right is a 
strong sense of certainty that how these international financial institutions (IFI’s) operate is 
well understood.  It has apparently given these critics little pause that the agreement between 
the left and the right that the IFI’s are bad comes only because these two camps hold 
diametrically opposed views of what these institutions actually do.  The left sees the IFI’s as 
instruments of global capitalism, forcing excessively harsh austerity on poor nations, while 
the right sees them as examples of bureaucratic inefficiency that help bolster global socialism 
by providing funds to national governments and thus helping them to postpone necessary 
economic reforms. 
 As one turns to scholarly writing, the situation is not much better.   Many authors 
seem anxious to jump as quickly as possible to policy conclusions and generally take as given 
some particular assumption about the behavior of the IFI’s, often bolstered by an example or 
two.  Again, however, while each such paper typically considers only one or two behavioral 
assumptions, across papers a substantial range of different assumptions about the positive   2
political economy of the IFI’s is made.  Often the IFI’s are depicted as being dominated by 
virtually autonomous international bureaucrats with little or no effective oversight.  
Alternatively, many in Europe, Japan, and the developing world view the IFI’s as lackeys of 
U.S. foreign policy with little independence of their own.  A third common view sees the IFI’s 
as captured by the rent seeking activities of the major private financial institutions.  The 
Marxists, of course, see these second and third assumptions as equivalent, with big capital 
running both U.S. foreign policy and the IFI’s.  Moreover, there are still a few who assume 
that the IFI’s operate primarily according to their concepts of the global public interest. 
 Clearly, this wide range of views signals the need for positive political economy 
research.  However, the number of studies which attempt to carefully develop and/or test 
hypothesis about the behavior of international financial institutions is distressing small, 
especially in contrast to the large literature which attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of IFI 
programs in various dimensions.
1 
This paper has the dual purposes of calling attention to this important lacuna in 
international political economy research and of offering a beginning effort toward filling this 
gap.  Given the amount of literature which views the IMF through various narrow and often 
conflicting political economy lenses, what is most needed at the present time are efforts to 
develop a more comprehensive framework for evaluating the relevance of these various 
narrow perspectives.  It is argued that while hard-core versions of public choice analysis such 
as Roland Vaubel’s hypothesis of a budget maximizing IMF are examples of such single lens 
political economy perspectives, a soft-core public choice approach can provide a useful 
framework for synthesizing these narrower approaches.  In contrast to the older grand theories   3
approach to international political economy which emphasized the contrasting perspectives of 
realists, liberals, and Marxists, the soft core public choice approach draws heavily on recent 
developments in behavioral and new institutional economics and international and 
comparative political economy.  Thus while it is based on the rational choice approach, it is 
skeptical of many applications of rational choice theory that assume high levels of 
information and foresight and ignore coordination and free rider problems within groups.  It is 
more in sympathy with recent analysis in international political economy that emphasizes the 
roles of information, ideas, and institutions and focuses on the interactions among domestic 
and international considerations, rather than assuming the natural primary of one or the other. 
Section II presents a brief overview of the traditional major political economy 
perspectives and how they tend to view the IMF.  Section III then sketches out key elements 
of the soft-core public choice approach as a synthesizing framework, while Section IV gives 
illustrations of how this approach can be applied to the IMF.  It is suggested that bureaucratic 
incentives for budget maximization play much less of a role at the IMF than in the typical 
government bureau, but that there are other possible sources of bias that are of serious 
concern.  Section V offers concluding remarks on some of the policy implications of the 
analysis.  It argues that while many needed reforms will be difficult to achieve, the soft core 
public choice approach offers a less pessimistic perspective on these possibilities than does 
the traditional hard core public choice approach. 
II. Major Political Economy Perspectives on the IMF 
Mainstream economists have traditionally adopted an optimal policy approach in 
which the range of activities a government or organization should undertake and the specifics 
                                                                                                                                                               
1 Exceptions include important work by Graham Bird, Tony Killick, and Roland Vaubel.  Very recently there has 
been a substantial increase in quantitative political economy research on the IMF by political scientists.  See, for   4
of the policies it should pursue are analyzed from the standpoint of economic optimization 
and market failure theory.  This approach assumes a public interest based institution that 
analyzes the need to provide public goods, correct externalities, and compensate for missing 
or misperforming markets.  In contrast with most economists’ view that the market failures 
requiring government action are fairly limited, many on the left see massive market failure.  
Combined with a public interest view of government, this leads to criticism of the IMF for 
being insufficiently activist. 
In contrast to these idealistic approaches, conspiracy theorists from the left see the 
Fund as an agent of the global capitalist class, serving special financial interests at the 
expense of the poor of the world.  While looking on the Fund as doing harm, they see massive 
market failure and the need for major income redistribution from the rich to the poor. Thus 
they advocate radical reform of the IMF.
2 
From the right, applications of hard core public choice analysis also conclude that the 
IMF does harm, but for quite different reasons.  This approach tends to assume perfect 
markets and rent seeking bureaucrats and special interest groups.  From this perspective the 
Fund is unnecessary, except as a welfare agency for economists, and should be abolished.
3 
Quite different traditions also accompany views on the effectiveness of institutions 
and organizations.  The optimal policy approach assumes an autonomous government that 
effectively implements policy.  Critiques from the left tend to see the IMF as all powerful 
from the standpoint of imposing its will on poor countries, but as very weak from the 
standpoint of resisting pressures from capitalists’ special interests.  Hard core public choice 
                                                                                                                                                               
example, Gould (2000), Stone (2000), Thacker (1999) and Vreeland (1999). 
2 See, for example, Danaher (1994) and Honeywell, et al (1983). 
3 See, for example, Bandow and Vasquez (1994).  Another useful collection of critiques from the right combined 
with defenses from the middle is presented in McQuillan and Montgomery (1999).   5
analysis from the right typically sees the Fund as having a great deal of bureaucratic 
autonomy from political oversight, but in some versions as being subject to considerable 
pressure from special interests, typically the financial sector and/or US policy officials.  While 
the IMF is viewed by many critics as autocratic and undemocratic, others see it as a lackey of 
U.S. foreign policy.  And while the idealist tradition in the international relations literature 
sees international organizations as powerful mechanisms for promoting good, realists see 
them as having little effect.
4 Neoliberal institutionalists take an intermediate view that 
institutions can help promote international cooperation in some instances, but that the process 
is not an easy one.
5 
There is indeed considerable disagreement among commentators about the 
effectiveness of IMF programs.  While popular criticisms from the left fault IMF policy 
conditionality for its excessive harshness, most systematic studies find that the ability of the 
IMF to enforce its conditionality has been quite weak.
6  Indeed, it has become common for 
critics on the right to argue that the typical effect of IMF programs is to delay rather than 
promote stabilization and liberalization.
7 
III. The Soft Core Public Choice Approach 
The approach advocated in this paper is a middle of the road synthesis of elements of 
these different approaches, a soft rather than hard-core public choice approach if you will.
8  It 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
4 For discussion of these perspectives, see Dillon, Ilgen and Willett (1991). 
5 See Keohane (1984).  Baldwin (1993) provides a useful collection of recent contributions to the debate on these 
issues. 
6 See the analysis and references in Bird (1995) and (1996), Killick (1995), (1996), and (1998), Krueger (1998), 
and Schadler et al (1995).  A more favorable evaluation is reached in Ul Haque and Kahn (2000). 
7 As Krueger (1998) notes, such strong negative statements are usually based on a few anecdotes, not systematic 
studies.  Still this is an area that deserves much more research. 
8 For a more general discussion of the public choice approach and its relation to other major approaches to the 
political economy of international economic relations, see Willett (1995) and the references therein.  See also 
Gilpin’s contribution to this volume.   6
recognizes both market and government failure but sees neither as all pervasive.  It envisions 
an IMF dominated by officials who are neither saints nor sinners.  They seek to do good, but 
are not entirely immune to bureaucratic incentives and external pressures.  This approach sees 
governments as typically facing both domestic and international pressures, but also having 
some scope for autonomy, the magnitude of which varies over time and across countries and 
issues in systematic ways that are subject to analysis.  It also recognizes the scope for 
bureaucratic politics and sees domestic pressures coming from both the general public and 
special interests.   
Such public choice analysis stems from rational choice theory, but unlike many of the 
formal game theory applications of rational choice theory, it focuses on the costs of acquiring 
information, the difficulties of understanding complex situations, and the coordination and 
free rider problems that occur where the number of actors involved is large.  Thus it helps 
explain why small well-organized groups can often win politically over the interests of much 
larger but unorganized groups.  Public choice analysis also emphasizes how even where the 
median voter is dominant, she may be rationally ignorant, thus giving rise to political 
pressures for political business cycles and other policies that create economic instabilities and 
inefficiencies.   
While certainly favoring democracy as a fundamental value, public choice scholars are 
skeptical of prescriptions of more democracy as the answer to all economic ills. They 
recognize the validity of rational expectations arguments that there will be learning behavior 
on the part of the public that will tend to diminish the incentives over time for governments to 
pursue perverse policies, but view this process as being much weaker than many rational 
expectations advocates.     7
Likewise, the public choice approach sees much less scope for a diffuse public to 
adapt strategic policies to sanction governments than have many recent game theory 
applications.  Public choice analysts usually view the political process as operating with much 
less foresight than have many recent rational choice game theory applications.  While many 
hard core rational choice modes assume that all relevant actors understand the true structures 
of the games they are playing, the soft core public choice perspectively emphasizes 
informational complexities, the role of uncertainly, and the role of ideas and differing mental 
models in explaining behavior.
9 
With respect to the characterizations of the environment faced by the IMF, a public 
choice perspective has a number of important implications.  It suggests that even good 
governments may behave in bad ways and therefore we need to take seriously the issue of 
imposing appropriate disciplines over some aspects of government behavior.  Note that this 
perspective even handily identifies failures in both voting and market mechanisms for 
providing governments with the incentives to adapt the correct polices.
10  It sees bounded 
rather than unconstrained rationality operating in both agendas.
11  Thus it helps explain why 
governments so often fail to take policies in time to prevent crises and provides a rationale for 
an organization like the IMF to help prod countries to adopt better economic policies and to 
help deal with crises when they do occur.
12  This perspective also suggests, however, that the 
IMF is itself unlikely to operate ideally.  This we must deal with a world in which markets, 
                                                   
9 For a discussion of these contrasting approaches to the issue of international policy coordination, see Willett 
(1999a) and on the role of different assumptions about correct economic theory in recent debates about the IMF, 
see Willett (2000d). 
10 Of course the concept of correct polices is far from unambiguous.  For the purposes at hand, it might be 
thought of as the policies that would be favored by the fully informed median citizen.  On these discipline issues, 
see Willett (2000a). 
11 On bounded rationality, see the contributions by Odell in this volume. 
12 Again, see Willett (2000a).   8
national governments, and international organizations are all three at times subject to 
imperfections. 
Turning to the behavior of the IMF the soft public choice perspective sees it as an 
organization that is likely to have some internal bureaucratic problems and that while having 
some scope for autonomy is also subject to some degree of formal political oversight by its 
membership and informal pressures from the major powers, client governments, and special 
interests such as multinational banks.  Thus while some specific hard core public choice 
applications will focus on just one of these modes – such as the IMF as the largely 
unconstrained international bureaucracy perceived by many on the right in the US Congress – 
the logic of the public choice perspective as a framework that encompasses many narrower 
specific theories or models should lead one to take a broad view of the considerations relevant 
to analyzing the political economy of the IMF.  This of course doesn’t mean that every 
analysis should try to cover everything.  That’s impossible, but analysts should try to be clear 
when they are dealing with only one of a number of potentially important aspects.  All too 
often the impression is given in papers that the aspect being emphasized is the only one of 
major importance.  This problem of single factor blinders has been much too common in both 
the public choice and the international political economy literature. 
Just as international relations scholars differ in the emphasis they place – both 
positively and normatively – on the relative importance of power versus plenty and of plenty 
for the general public versus special groups, so too do public choice analysts disagree about 
the relative importance of the objectives pursued by actors in the public area.  The natural 
starting point for economists is to assume that economic interests matter most, and for 
domestic political scientists is that reelection, matters most.  In both fields, there has been   9
heated battle over whether ideology may also be important.  Hard core public choice analysts 
are less sympathetic to the inclusion of the importance of ideology that are those of a softer 
persuasion.  Likewise soft-core adherents are not as likely to throw out public interest 
motivations as completely.  As will be discussed below, much can be learned from starting 
with the hard-core assumption that IMF bureaucrats primary objectives is budget 
maximization.  The soft-core perspective argues that analysis should not stop here, however.  
In some cases the incentives for budget maximization may be low and other objectives may 
be of much greater importance. 
The public choice approach also emphasizes that its not enough just to figure out what 
is the best economic policy (difficult as this may be).  One must also worry about the political 
economy of implementation and the effectiveness of policies and institutions.  It stresses the 
need for careful analysis of governance and influence structures, recognizing the need for 
attention to informal as well as formal procedures.  It acknowledges that configurations of 
effective decision making power can vary greatly from one type of case to another.  The soft 
public choice approach rejects both the extremes that institutional structures don’t matter and 
that they are fully effective.
13  It argues that such questions require careful case-by-case 
analysis of effects on incentive structures.  It is quite kindred in spirit to neoliberal 
institutionalism, but focuses on the role of domestic as well as international considerations. 
There is, of course, not a clearly defined dividing line between what I am terming hard 
and soft-core public choice choices.  They share much in common and many studies would be 
hard to classify as falling into one category or the other.  In my terminology exclusive 
emphasis on anyone specific public choice theory would usually qualify as hard-core, while 
consideration of multiple influences or specific theories would be soft-core.  Thus the soft-  10
core version emphasizes public choice analysis as an approach.  The soft-core approach is 
willing to entertain a broader range of objectives for actors, a broader range of actors as being 
relevant to any particular analysis, puts greater emphasis on the importance of different 
mental models, and is more cognizant of uncertainties about the ‘correct’ economic and 
political models.  Thus to critics, the soft-core approach will appear to be too wishy washy, 
while to supporters it is seen as being more realistic. 
Soft-core public choice analysis need not be in fundamental conflict with the optimal 
policy approach.  Indeed, the use of public choice for normative policy analysis often begins 
with the optimal policy approach to identify the agenda for possible desirable government 
actions.  The public choice approach is wary, however, of jumping directly from a finding of 
market failure to advocacy of government action.  Besides emphasizing the traditional 
economists’ concern with the technical feasibility of implementing welfare enhancing 
policies, it also considers the political feasibility of adopting these policies and highlights the 
danger that government actions may be diverted to other purposes such as rent seeking.   
Some have viewed public choice analysis as being inherently conservative or anti 
government.
14  This is not so.  Being realistic about the difficulties of policy implementation 
can only make for more effective policy.  Recognizing that government officials may be 
subject to pressures and temptations is not to insult their character – it is only to recognize that 
they’re human.  If a situation is heavily politicized then it is folly to advocate a policy that can 
only be implemented effectively in a politics free environment.   
                                                                                                                                                               
13 See, for example, Willett (2000e). 
14 See, for example, the contribution by Gilpin in this volume.  It is true that many of the most important 
contributors to the development of public choice have been to the right on the political spectrum, but there have 
been important counter examples such as Kenneth Arrow and Mancur Olsen.   11
Of course the soft public choice approach has a serious shortcoming in comparison 
with many of the other political economy approaches discussed above.  It does not offer easy 
answers.  It is a framework rather than a specific theory.  It is in effect a broad eclectic 
approach to political economy that sees value in many different ways of gaining knowledge.  
It sees the tracing out of the implications of a narrow set of assumptions to be quite valuable, 
but it is hostile to the common tendency to over generalize from such types of analysis.  It 
argues that genuine testing must attempt to discriminate among alternative hypothesis, not 
settle just for evidence that is consistent with one’s favored theory.  It does not offer quick 
easy conclusions that apply to all situations – either with respect to diagnosis or prescription. 
It seems possible, however, that this seeming disadvantage is in fact its greatest advantage.  
IV. Applications to the IMF 
 
Public choice analysis of the IMF began with an important series of papers (by Roland 
Vaubel [1986], [1991], and [1996]), Vaubel developed a public choice analysis of the tasks 
likely to be given to international organizations and applied his analysis to the IMF and World 
Bank.  In these latter efforts, he makes the common public choice assumption that 
“Bureaucracies are interested in power, prestige, and amenities.  To achieve these objectives, 
they try to maximize their budget, their staff, and their independence” (1996, p. 195).  
However, another important contributor to the development of public choice analysis of 
international organizations, Bruno Frey (1997), argues that “The public choice literature is 
rather mute on the question of how employees in an international organization use the leeway 
accorded them” (p. 120) and offers the suggestion that “international bureaucrats pursue those 
policies that give them most prestige and influence within the reference groups with which 
they are connected” (p. 121).     12
I believe that Frey’s call for greater study of the objectives pursued within 
international organizations is well taken.  Vaubel is able to use his hard-core budget 
maximization assumption to explain a number of important aspects of IMF behavior that he 
argues are at variance with public interest interpretations.  In some cases, however, the 
evidence he presents is equally consistent with public interest interpretations.  For example, 
Vaubel explains the IMF’s penchant for discretion over rules in terms of bureaucratic interest.  
If one adheres to monetarist or new classical macroeconomic views than indeed this is a clear 
test of bureaucratic versus public interest objects.  If one adopts a Keynesian macroeconomic 
perspective, however, then one cannot discriminate between the two hypotheses on this issue.  
They are observationally equivalent.
15 
Another reason for needing to extend Vaubel’s analysis is that even where the 
evidence does clearly conflict with a public interest perspective, there may be other reasons 
than Vaubel’s for this to occur.  Depending on the reasons for divergence from public interest 
behavior, different reform strategies might be suggested.  Furthermore, the prospects for 
effective reforms may also be affected by the reasons for the observed behavior.   
There is rather widespread agreement that at least at times the IMF has suffered from 
tendencies for loan pushing and insufficient enforcement of loan conditionality.  Such 
behavior is not consistent with the saintly public interest view.  Hard and soft-core public 
analyses view this problem somewhat differently, however.  In Vaubel’s hard-core analysis, 
loan pushing by the IMF is seen as a result of budget maximization objectives.  An alternative 
explanation, however, is that IMF staff’s career advancement may be put at risk if they lose 
access to high level national officials in the countries they monitor.  Their ability to impede 
                                                   
 
15 For further discussion of Vaubel’s analysis, see Willett (2000e).   13
access in turn gives national officials leverage to minimize criticisms and to secure continued 
financing.  The problems with such perceived incentives for IMF staff to not rock the boat are 
discussed in the recent IMF external review of its surveillance policies (IMF 1999). Once 
highlighted the problems of loan pushing are likely to be much more amenable to correction 
by altering incentive structures within the Fund if they are due primarily to soft core 
considerations, rather than to hard core budget maximization objectives. 
In an earlier analysis I argued that the budget maximization analysis has a low degree 
of applicability to national monetary policy making at a relatively independent central banks 
and suggested that a softer public choice approach that focused more on the external pressures 
on the monetary discussion makers would prove more fruitful.
16  I would expect budget 
considerations to be more important at the IMF than at national central banks, but would not 
be surprised to find that for top IMF officials they are a relatively low priority.
17  An able staff 
is helpful for monetary officials to accomplish objectives of prestige and influence reputation 
with relevant peer groups, but this staff need not be a very large one.  At the IMF, the 
management and top bureaucrats have little incentives to hold down salaries and indeed Fund 
officials are extremely well paid, but top IMF managers would seem to have relatively low 
personal interest incentives to greatly expand staff size to increase their prestige or chances 
for advancement.
18  
My analysis was in the spirit of Chant and Acheson (1972) and Acheson and Chant 
(1973), who provided the first explicit public choice analysis of the objective functions of 
monetary authorities.  Assuming that central bankers’ primary goals were prestige and self-
                                                   
16 See Willett (1990). 
17 See Willett (2000e). 
18 The budget maximization assumption has come under general attack in the recent literature on bureaucracy.  
For valuable reviews, see Borcherding and Khursheed (1998), Moe (1997) and Wintrobe (1997).   14
preservation, these papers helped explain a number of aspects of central bank behavior, 
especially the emphasis on secrecy.   
The soft-core public choice approach should not be taken as totally optimistic or a half 
brother of the public interest – optimal policy approach.  It does grant that there can be a 
substantial public interest component in the utility functions of many officials, but also 
recognizes that the human animal has become quite adept at convincing itself of the 
widespread coincidence of private and public interests.  Even assuming away greed and major 
character failures, there are numerous sources of bias to which all but saints may be 
susceptible.  Let us consider three. 
One is that humans tend to respond to lobbying pressure.  Thus if most of the “advice” 
that senior officials are getting is from a few particular groups such as selected national policy 
officials and the financial community, then these points of view are likely to help shape the 
officials’ own perceptions.  Personal threats and bribes are not required.  A second powerful 
motivation is freedom to do one’s job.  Thus officials will typically prefer discretion over 
rules and prefer to minimize the monitoring of their actions.  A third motivation is the fear of 
failure and desire to minimize criticism. 
Motives two and three – desire for freedom of action and dislike of failure or criticism 
– combine to yield a preference for lack of transparency in some important areas.  This has 
been a common characteristic in national central banks as well as the Fund.  Of course there 
are quite valid arguments why complete transparency of discussions of monetary policy 
making and IMF programs is not desirable.  A balance must be found.  The point from public 
choice analysis is that if left entirely to themselves, senior officials would likely have a human 
tendency to draw the line at less transparency than would the well informed impartial   15
spectator.  Lack of transparency has indeed been a major source of criticism of the IMF, 
although strong public pressure from the U.S. Congress and others in recent years has helped 
induce a movement toward substantially greater transparency at the Fund. 
Fear of failure also suggests that government officials will in general have a tendency 
to want to over insure against crisis.
19  Thus we would expect the management of the Fund to 
prefer to err on the side of quota increases and IMF packages that were too large rather than 
too small.  This would also tend to bias Fund officials against pulling the plug on programs 
quickly enough when compliance has been unsatisfactory and to agree to initiate programs 
even though the odds for success are not high.
20 
These types of policies have the common feature that from an exclusively short time 
perspective, the benefits of implementing or continuing a program will exceed the costs, but 
that in the process moral hazard incentives will be increased and the prospects for future 
crises worsened.  When one has operational responsibility for the short run, it is very hard to 
give enough weight to the long term as any dieter knows only too well. 
The same type of difficulty applies to proposals that the IMF go public much more 
frequently when national officials repeated failure to heed its warnings.  This could indeed 
unleash an immensely powerful weapon – speculative capital flows – against recalcitrant 
governments.
21  It is hardly realistic, however, to expect the IMF to tilt more than modestly in 
this direction unless we replace human officials with robots or make substantial changes in 
the incentive structures that they face. 
                                                   
19 See Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (1975). 
20 The Fund has demonstrated considerable willingness to pull the plug on programs, at least for countries 
without strong geopolitical significance.  For example, in a sample of 45 programs reviewed by Schadler et al 
(1995), 28 were canceled for noncompliance.  This certainly falsified the extreme view that the Fund has made 
itself a helpless hostage to host countries.  Often, however, the IMF would reinstate programs without sufficient 
evidence that policy compliance was likely to be better in the future. 
21 See, for example, Eichengreen (1999).   16
V. Concluding Remarks on Policy Implications 
The extent to which the hard core or soft core public choice analysis of the IMF is 
more accurate has important implications both for the best strategies for attempting to reform 
the IFI’s and for the likelihood that reform efforts will be successful.  One of the banes of 
public choice scholars is that the same types of analysis that identify possibilities for 
improvements in public policy also usually suggest that it would be extremely difficult to get 
the called for reforms through the political process.
22 To the extent that the soft core approach 
is relevant, however, the chances for reform will often be substantially enhanced.  In these 
circumstances the spotlight of public opinion can have much more powerful effects. 
To help correct possible imbalances in external influences on the IMF, a first step 
would be to evaluate whether there are important voices that at present have too little or too 
much access.  Then one can begin to consider how such imbalances might be reduced.  In 
approaching this question it is important to recognize that the most important question is not 
what groups lack physical access, but rather what major interests are left out or are seriously 
under represented in the policy process.  For example, because there is a negative rather than 
positive long run trade off between inflation and growth,
23 there is likely little difference of 
long run interest between the major commercial banks and the typical citizens of developing 
countries with respect to the goal of long run macro economic stability.   
For issues of debt renegotiation, however, there is a substantial difference of interest. 
The same would hold with respect to issues of moral hazard.  Thus the public choice 
perspective raises the questions whether the lack of enthusiasm in official circles for new 
                                                   
22 See, for example, Tollison (1997). 
23 See, for example, Sarel (1996) and Burdekin, et al (1995).   17
mechanisms for the orderly workouts of bad debts after crises may not be due in part to 
excessive attention to the views of the financial sectors in the lending countries.
24 
Here the Fund has taken public positions on the need for greater financial sector 
burden sharing that are quite at variance with the positions of the major financial institutions.  
This clearly demonstrates that the IMF is not just a mouthpiece for these interests.  Relatively 
little action has been taken, however, so conspiracy theorists could interpret the IMF position 
as a clever subterfuge to give the IMF a false appearance of legitimacy and independence.   
In addition to the financial sector and governments in client countries, the other most 
likely candidate for excessive influence is the governments of the major industrial countries, 
especially the United States.
25  A prime example here is the disastrous loan to Russian in 
1998.  Contrary to the hard-core loan-pushing hypothesis, numerous interviews with Fund 
officials suggest that the IMF was very reluctant to make this loan and did so only after 
considerable political pressure from the governments of the major industrial countries.   
This pressure is easily explained in terms of standard public choice analysis.  These 
governments wanted to make loans to Russia on geopolitical grounds, but they didn’t want to 
go to their legislatures to ask for tax funds.  There was little political support for such 
measures (except from the financial sector) so the leaders would have had to use up a good 
deal of political capital.  Far better from the standpoint of short-term political popularity was 
                                                   
24 Note, however, that within the U.S. government there was considerable hostility toward the New York 
financial community in the early post war period.  In the negotiations on the establishment of the post war 
international monetary system, and the IMF neither of the major participants, the American and British 
governments, catered especially to the national financial community.  See Henning (1996).  While this tradition 
continues to be honored by some populist legislators, relationships between the executive branch and the 
financial community have become much closer over time and Henning concludes that, “Without the active 
support of the bankers, it is doubtful that there would have been a Fund quote increase in the final half of the 
1980’s,” pp. 180.  Many recent observers have assumed that the IMF has been captured by the financial interests 
of the major industrial countries, witness the frequent labeling of the IMF during the international debt crisis of 
the 1980’s as the bill collector for the commercial banks and Jagdish Bhagwati’s (1998) recent polemic against 
the Wall Street Treasury Complex.  Other discussions of banking influence include Cohen (1982), Frieden 
(1987), Kapur (1998) and Pauly (1997).   18
to fund aid to Russia on the cheap by using the IMF.  The long run cost of this strategy in 
terms of further damaging the credibility of the IMF was likely considerable,
26 but this carried 
little weight in the classic benefits now, costs later political incentive structure. 
  Of course identifying potential biases is much easier than correcting them.  Still the 
effort is worthwhile.  Increased awareness of such potential biases may in themselves have 
some effect.  There has certainly been a substantial increase in the transparency associated 
with IMF programs over the last several years.  There may also be methods of revising 
institutional structures and/or management practices to reduce some of the major problems of 
loan pushing and insufficient enforcement.  Thus, for example, if Fund country officers are 
seen to be susceptible to partial capture by client governments and have become too cautious 
in recommending the termination of programs where policy conditions are being 
insufficiently met, then it would seem desirable to institute an internal review board that 
would vet the recommendations of missions before they were sent to the Executive Board.  
The same would hold with respect to crisis bailouts designed to limit contagion. 
 Indeed the Fund did create just such a mechanism some time ago in the form of its 
Department of Policy Development and Review.
27 However, discussions with IMF staff and 
the research studies on the enforcement of IMF programs suggest that the effectiveness of this 
review mechanism has been limited. While serving as a strong potential counter to possible 
biases of area department staff, the review department has little independence from senior 
management which still controls the career paths of the officials who staff the department.  
This suggests the possibility that the senior management of the Fund, even though they are 
                                                                                                                                                               
25 See, for example, Kapstein (1994), Kapur (1998) and Thacker (1999). 
26 See, for example, Willett (2000b).   19
appointed directly by the IMF member governments for limited terms, may be a greater 
source of bias than the career staff.  If correct, this would make it particularly useful to devise 
ways of strengthening the Executive Board relative to management and especially of limiting 
the management's ability to informally commit the IMF before discussions by the Executive 
Board.
28  In response to recent criticisms the IMF has announced that it will establish a new 
independent evaluation unit.  The precise institutional structure of this new unit, not yet 
announced, will be of considerable importance, but this is certainly a desirable step.  Also 
quite encouraging is the attitude taken by the new Managing Director, Horst Köhler, in 
support of rolling back the huge amount of mission creep that had worked its way into the 
IMF’s programs of policy conditionality.  Köhler’s predecessor, Michel Camdeseus, had been 
a strong defender of mission creep against a wide array of criticisms.
29 
The considerations discussed here suggest that despite the problems of political 
manipulation, giving the Fund management complete discretionary autonomy would likely 
not be a good idea.
30 On the other hand, there is a strong case for giving the IMF more 
protection from short run political pressures along the same line as the case for independence 
of national central banks.  The governance structure of the IMF is now under debate, with the 
French pushing for greater political oversight through a strengthening the role of the 
ministerial level Oversight Committee relative to the Executive Board, which is staffed by 
                                                                                                                                                               
27 The Research Department also plays such a role to some extent.  Policy Development and Review was not 
started from scratch, but rather was based on the long standing Department of Exchange and Trade Relations, 
which had been the defacto coordinating group for the area departments. 
28 Engelen (1998) suggests this has been a problem.  There have been suggestions that the Executive Board has 
tended to play too passive a role in setting the IMF policy.  The desirability of upgrading the seniority and 
effectiveness of the IMF’s Executive Board is one of the major recommendations of the Bretton Woods 
Commission (1994). 
29 See, for example, Willett (2000c). 
30 For a specific proposal to give the Fund much greater independence see De Gregorio et al (1999).   20
lower level political appointments.  An uncharitable interpretation of the French motivation, 
however, is to develop a stronger political counterweight to the influence of the US. 
 So far, there appears to have been little discussion of what kinds of principles should 
guide discussion of the Fund's governance structure.  An important question is to what extent 
do the arguments for central bank independence in a domestic context argue for autonomy for 
the IMF?  The recent trend in thinking by scholars working on central bank independence and 
the tradeoff between autonomy and accountability has been to reject goal independence for 
the central bank but to favor policy independence to meet goals that have been determined 
through the political process and to provide mechanisms for sanctioning the bank if there are 
sufficiently great deviations from meeting these objectives.  Where there is a single, 
reasonably quantifiable objective, this approach seems quite attractive, as with the inflation 
target approach of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  It is unclear, however, to what extent 
such an approach would be applicable to the more complex objectives of the IMF.  The 
governance principles for the IMF are clearly an important topic on which the literature on 
public choice and constitutional political economy should be highly relevant.   
Much harder to tackle are problems of the use of the Fund by the major powers for 
political purposes.  Even here, however, there may be some basis for a little optimism.  
Despite the widespread criticisms (for opposing reasons) from the far left and right, in the 
words of Dave Hale (1998), the IMF is needed “now more than ever.”  It is in the longer-term 
self-interest of the major powers not to undercut the effectiveness of the IMF.  Of course, it is 
a pipe dream to think that the IMF, any more than national central banks, can be fully 
depoliticized.  But as has now occurred in central banking legislation in many of the industrial 
countries, there is some hope that governments might be willing to lengthen their time   21
horizons and embrace approaches that stress medium term stability over short term 
expediency.  Governments’ willingness to rise to such occasions is, of course, in quite scarce 
supply, but the soft core approach suggests that sometimes it can happen.   22
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